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We apply a Bernheim-Whinston (1986) type mechanism to a situation where a single
buyer with uncertain demand wishes to buy from a small number of suppliers. We
let suppliers bid a payment contingent on own quantity supplied, and another pay-
ment contingent on the realization of total demand. We show that there is a unique
equilibrium which is also eﬃcient. This equilibrium is equivalent to the one under
the ‘truthful bids’ restriction used in the model without uncertainty in Bernheim-
Whinston (1986).
Keywords: Procurement, Eﬃcient Auctions, Multi Unit Auctions, Uniqueness.1 Introduction
The menu auction mechanism suggested by Bernheim-Whinston (1986) is particularly
relevant in situations where a single buyer wishes to buy from a (small) number of
potential suppliers. The buyer could be a ﬁrm or a local or central government, and
the good or service in question could range from care for the elderly, snow removal,
garbage collection to electricity generation. The Bernheim-Whinston mechanism is a
tractable and reasonable one. It has a single agent on one side of the market and this
agent is assumed to behave in his own interests and maximize his surplus as one would
expect authorities to do when outsourcing. Nevertheless, it has two diﬃculties. First,
there are many equilibria in the Bernheim-Whinston game of which only one (which
occurs when bids are restricted to diﬀer from true total costs only by a constant) is
eﬃcient. Second, demand is assumed to be certain while it seems inherently uncertain
in the situations we have in mind: the exact level of services needed or electricity
required depends on random elements. Therefore, contracts or bids will need to be
contingent on the outcome of such randomness.1
Despite these drawbacks a large literature applies this model together with the
restriction on bids (called the “truthful bids” restriction from here on) that makes
equilibrium unique. Grossman and Helpman (1994), (1995) (and a literature spawned
by them) develop models of political economy and lobbying using this framework.2 Kr-
1The supply function bidding mechanism studied by Klemperer and Meyer (1989),a n db e f o r e
them Robson (1981), could be used to deal with such randomness. However, equilibria in supply
functions are not eﬃcient unless suppliers are identical.
2Earlier literature using the common agency/menu auction model to study lobbying and political
inﬂuence includes Spiller (1990) and Tranæs (1993).
1ishna and Tranæs (2002) use it to study multi unit auctions with many bidders, when
bidder valuations take on a number of diﬀerent shapes. Anton and Yao (1989, 1992)
study a single-buyer-two-supplier version. However, their results do not generalize to
more than two suppliers.
In this paper we show that taking care of the second diﬃculty successfully over-
comes the ﬁrst as well. Introducing demand uncertainty into the model of Bernheim-
Whinston (1986) has a dramatic inﬂuence on the set of equilibria; with demand cer-
tainty almost any allocation is a (Nash) equilibrium, while with uncertain demand
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. Moreover, this equilibrium is ex-post eﬃ-
cient and for each realization of demand it coincides with the equilibrium under the
“truthful-bid” restriction used in Bernheim-Whinston (1986).
The single-buyer-many-sellers game we study in this paper goes like this: a number
of suppliers submit bid functions simultaneously. Next total demand is realized. After
this the buyer allocates demand to each bidder so as to minimize his acquisition
costs. Each supplier is paid according to his bid, that is, if he is asked to supply x
u n i t sh ei sp a i dt h ea m o u n to fm o n e yh ed e m a n d e di nr e t u r nf o rx units delivered.
Note that this is not the case in eﬃcient mechanisms like the Clark-Groves-Vickrey
mechanism where your payment is determined by everyone else’s bid.3 The diﬀerence
from the Bernheim-Whinston mechanism arises from demand being uncertain. To
accommodate this uncertainty we allow ﬁr m st ob i dt w of u n c t i o n s :aﬁxed payment
function which depends on the realization of total demand and a variable payment
3After Vickrey (1961), Clark (1971), and Groves (1973).
2function that depends on the ﬁrm’s supply.
Our results suggest that if demand is uncertain our scheme can be used to ensure
that competition, even among a small number of suppliers, results in eﬃciency. In
equilibrium suppliers ask for their costs as the variable payment and ask for as much as
they can as the ﬁxed payment, keeping in mind that if they ask for too much, they will
not be used at all. The ﬁxed payment that suppliers ask for in equilibrium is exactly
their social contributions, that is, the additional costs which the society, behaving
optimally, would have had to incur had that particular supplier not existed. Given
these payment requests, demand is allocated across suppliers so that their marginal
costs are equalized and production is eﬃcient. As each supplier obtains his social
contribution as proﬁts, externalities resulting from investment and entry decisions
would be internalized and optimal under such mechanism, which is a further merit to
the scheme.4
In Section 2 we set up the model and in Section 3 we prove the main results.
Section 4 discusses our basic assumptions and considers generalizations. Section 5
concludes.
2 The Model
There is one buyer and m potential suppliers. The set of potential suppliers is denoted
by M. Each supplier i ∈ M faces production costs Ci(qi) with Ci(0) = 0. Suppliers
ﬁrst simultaneously submit their bids. Following this, the state is realized. This
4In Krishna and Tranæs (2001) we discuss the applicability of this mechanism to deregulated
markets like wholesale electricity markets.
3determines the level of completely inelastic demand, n, which is a random variable
with strictly positive density everywhere on the support [0,N).I f N = ∞,w es a y
that demand has full support. Finally, demand is allocated across the suppliers to
minimize acquisition costs.
All players have complete information about the model as well as each others
costs and are proﬁt maximizers. A strategy for Supplier i is a function Bi(qi,n),
specifying the total payment requested as a function of the quantity supplied qi, and
n. We restrict this to consist of a “variable” payment Ti(qi), solely depending on
the quantity supplied qi and with Ti(0) = 0; and a “ﬁxed” payment Si(n),w h i c hi s
independent of the quantity supplied but contingent on the total purchase n, by the
buyer; Si(n) is paid only to those chosen to supply. Hence, Bi(qi,n)=Ti(qi)+Si(n).
T h ev a r i a b l ep a y m e n ti sa s s u m e dt ob eat w i c ec o n t i n u o u s l yd i ﬀerentiable function
mapping quantity into revenue: Ti :( −∞,∞) → (−∞,∞).5 The ﬁxed payment is
just any function: Si :[ 0 ,∞) → (−∞,∞), which maps total quantity into revenue.
We make the following assumptions throughout:
Assumption 1 Ci(·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, with C0
i(0) = 0,C 0
i(·) > 0,
and 0 <C 00
i (·) < ∞ for qi > 0.
Assumption 2 0 <T 0
i(qi) < ∞ for qi > 0.
In Section 4 we discuss the importance of our assumptions and consider general-
izations.
5Letting suppliers specify a variable payment in case they supply a negative quantity is of no
importance to our results, but it makes the variable payment functions everywhere diﬀerentiable and
this simpliﬁes the analysis.
43 Existence and Uniqueness
In this section we present our main results. We are going to make extensive use of the





















qi = n and qi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ M.
Then supplier j’s social contribution Ssc






and thus it measures the decrease in the minimized costs associated with including
supplier j in providing the n units. We can now state our main theorem. We consider
only pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Theorem 1 Assume that n has full support, and for all i,T 0
i(0) = 0. Then there exists
a unique equilibrium which consists of each supplier asking for a variable payment
which equals his production costs, Ci(qi),a n daﬁx e dp a y m e n tw h i c he q u a l sSsc
i (n) for
all n. This equilibrium is ex-post eﬃcient.
Proof.
5The proof has two parts. In part 1, we show that {B∗
i (qi,n)}i∈M,w h e r eB∗
i (qi,n)=
Ci(qi)+ Ssc
i (n), is an equilibrium. In part 2 we show it is the unique equilibrium.
Part 1. Assume that all suppliers but j, M−j, bid B∗
i (qi,n)=Ci(qi)+ Ssc
i (n).
We label this proﬁle {B∗
i (qi,n)}i6=j . We check that it is a best reply for supplier j to
bid Cj(qj)+ Ssc
j (n) as well. For each realization of the random variable n, the buyer
allocates the n units to the diﬀerent suppliers so as to minimize his total payment.









qi = n, qi ≥ 0,i=1 ,..,m.
Note that if T0
i(qi) became vertical at some point, this problem would not have a
solution and if C0
i(·) ever did, it might be impossible for a ﬁrm to produce certain
output levels. Assumption 1 and 2 exclude these situations.
In order to show that B∗
j(qj,n) is a best reply against {B∗
i (qi,n)}i6=j we ﬁrst con-
struct j0s residual marginal revenue curve.
( 1 )W ed e r i v et h eh i g h e s tp a y m e n tS u p p l i e rj can get from the buyer for any quan-
tity qj s u p p l i e di ns t a t en, given {B∗
i (qi,n)}i6=j . We name this payment Pj(qj;n,B∗
i6=j)
and show that it is a concave function.
( 2 )W ec h a r a c t e r i z et h ep r o ﬁt maximizing supply q∗
j(n) given {B∗
i (qi,n)}i6=j,w h i c h
is the qj that maximizes Pj(qj;n,B∗
i6=j) − Cj(qj), and the maximal proﬁts that can
be obtained by Supplier j. P 0(qj;n,B∗
i6=j) can be interpreted as supplier j0s residual
marginal revenue curve.
6(3) Finally, we show that bidding B∗
j(qj,n) ensures that Supplier j gets to supply
q∗
j(n) units and obtain these maximized proﬁts, given that all other suppliers bid
{B∗
i (qi,n)}i6=j . In eﬀect we show that B∗
j(qj,n) is a best response to B∗
i6=j even if only
j was allowed to make variable bids which were state contingent. Thus it is certainly
a best response when his strategies are limited to the form assumed here.
Consider (1). Pj(qj;n,B∗
i6=j) is the diﬀerence in minimized costs to the buyer of
purchasing all n units demanded, versus n − qj of the n units demanded, from the
suppliers in M−j. T h i si sb e c a u s et h ea l t e r n a t i v et ob u y i n gqj from Supplier j is
buying it from the remaining suppliers. In order to purchase n−qj units at minimum











qi + qj = n, qi ≥ 0 for i6= j.
where q−j is the allocation vector for all suppliers but j. Let the value function for this
problem be denoted R−j(qj,n;B∗
i6=j). It is the minimum cost of buying n − qj units
from all suppliers but j when n units are demanded in total. Similarly, R−j(0,n;B∗
i6=j)
gives the minimized cost of obtaining n units from the suppliers in M−j.N o t e t h a t
R0
−j(n;n,B∗





i6=j). This deﬁnes the highest
total payment Supplier j can get from selling qj units in state n given {B∗
i(qi,n)}i6=j.
7We will use Pj(qj;n,B∗
i6=j) to derive Supplier j0sp r o ﬁt maximizing supply in each state
given {B∗
i (qi,n)}i6=j. Given our assumptions on costs, there is a well deﬁned unique
solution to the above problem and by the Berge maximum theorem, R−j(qj,n;B∗
i6=j) is






< 0 equals the fall in cost when one less unit is purchased by the buyer from all
suppliers but j, which equals their common marginal cost. Also, R00
−j(qj,n;B∗
i6=j) > 0









i6=j) < 0. Thus Pj(qj;n;B∗
i6=j) is increasing and concave





In Figure 1, if the origin for j is at the left, and for all others is at the right,
P0
j(0;n,B∗
i6=j) is represented by the height at the intersection of the curve representing
the horizontal sum of the marginal costs of all other included suppliers but j, with
the vertical axis, or OjD, as the n’th unit is purchased at the common marginal cost
of the remaining included suppliers. Of course, P0
j(qj;n,B∗
i6=j) traces out the entire
curve DO−j as qj rises from zero. The concavity of Pj(qj;n,B∗
i6=j) is reﬂected in the





i6=j)=0ensures that Firm j0s residual marginal revenue
is anchored at O−j. It is worth noting that as qj rises, n − qj falls so that the set of
included suppliers for the given payments oﬀered by suppliers will shrink. At points
where the set of suppliers shrinks, Pj(qj;n,B∗
i6=j) will have a kink. Since P(qj;n,B∗
i6=j)
i sc o n c a v eg i v e nt h ep a y m e n t so ﬀered are B∗,P 0
j(qj;n,B∗
i6=j) will have a vertical drop
at such points.
8When a supplier is added, it is because the savings from paying his lower marginal
bid are just enough to cover his ﬁxed bid. Thus, ﬁxed payments are incorporated in
the area below P0
i(.). Of course, at qi = n, it is worth dropping the last other supplier
and his ﬁxed payments are not captured by the area under P0
i(.). Notice that for this
reason, with 2 suppliers, P0
i(.) only captured variable bids of the other supplier.
Outputs in the candidate equilibrium are all positive by construction. Later on we
will show that all suppliers must be included in any equilibrium. A consequence of
this is that in equilibrium such vertical drops occur only to the right of the equilibrium
level of qj and so are not relevant. For this reason we do not even draw these drops
in our ﬁgures. Of course, when there are only two suppliers this is not an issue.
Consider (2). What quantity should Supplier j aim for in each state and what are
the highest proﬁts he can obtain state by state?







j(n) denote the value of qj that maximizes Πj(qj;n,B∗
i6=j).A sPj(qj;n,B∗
i6=j) is
increasing and concave in qj and Cj(qj) is assumed to be strictly convex, Πj(qj;n,B∗
i6=j)


















i6=j) is the maximized proﬁt available to Supplier j given {B∗
i (qi,n)}i6=j .




i6=j) (which in turn equals C0
j(qi(n)) or
9the marginal cost of any included supplier), P0
j(qj;n,B∗
i6=j) is the horizontal sum of the
marginal bids of the suppliers M−j , which are their marginal costs by assumption, or
O−jD in Figure 1. Thus q∗
j(n) is given by the intersection of j0s marginal cost curve,
OjC with O−jD, and Πj(q∗
j(n);n,B∗
i6=j) is the area between O−jD and OjC up to the
equilibrium output. Thus, Πj(q∗
j(n);n,B∗
i6=j)=Ssc
j (n), which is suppliers j0ss o c i a l
contribution.
Consider (3). Can Supplier j get to supply q∗
j(n) and earn Πj(q∗
j(n);n,B∗
i6=j) using
only the restricted functions allowed, given {B∗
i (qi,n)}i6=j? The function B∗
j does the






i6=j) still available to be retained for Supplier j. To appropriate it, j
sets Sj(n)=Πj(q∗
j(n);n,B∗
i6=j).T h u s ,w i t hΠj(q∗
j(n);n,B∗
i6=j)=Ssc
j (n) it is certainly
a best reply for Supplier j to bid B∗
j(qj,n)=Cj(qj)+Ssc
j (n) given that all other
suppliers bid {B∗
i (qi,n)}i6=j .
Since Supplier j was chosen arbitrarily we have shown that {B∗
i (qi,n)}i∈M is an
equilibrium which completes the proof of Part 1.
Part 2. We need to show that {B∗
i (qi,n)}i∈M is the unique equilibrium. First we
show that the equilibrium allocation must be an interior one (Lemma 1). Second,
w es h o wt h ev a r i a b l eb i d sn e e dt ob et h es u p p l i e r ’ st r u ec o s t s( L e m m a2a n d3 ) .
Finally, given this, we show that each supplier’s ﬁxed payment needs to be his social
contribution.
Let Smc
j (n;B) be the marginal contribution of j in state n when the m suppliers
bid B. It deﬁnes the highest ﬁxed payment j can ask for without being excluded by
10the buyer. In an interior solution, it is depicted by the area between P0
j(qj;n,Bi6=j)
and T0
j(qj) up to qj(n;B), the supply obtained from j by the buyer given B and n.
Recall that marginal contributions would equal social contributions if all suppliers bid
their true marginal costs as their variable payments.
Notice that in an interior solution, given what other suppliers bid, each supplier
can do no better than bid his marginal cost as his variable payment and his state
dependent marginal contribution as his ﬁxed payment. This strategy obtains the
state by state maximum for each supplier. This is easy to see as the function Pi(.)
is continuous, since it is a value function. Hence Pi(.) − Ci(.) is also continuous and
attains its maximum somewhere in [0,n] independent of whatever peculiar bids are
oﬀered by other suppliers. If this is an interior maximum these maximized proﬁts
can be attained by bidding as suggested above. Notice that P0
i(.) is the horizontal
sum of marginal bids of included suppliers in M−i. Also, that P0
i(.) acts like supplier
i’ sm a r g i n a lr e v e n u ec u r v e . W ew i l lm a k ee x t e n s i v eu s eo ft h e s ef a c t si ns h o w i n g
uniqueness below.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium, all suppliers supply strictly positive quantities for all
n>0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Next we establish that variable payments are necessarily equal to variable costs.
F i r s tw es h o wt h i si ss oa tz e r o .
Lemma 2 In equilibrium, T0
i(0) = C0
i(0) = 0 for all i.
11Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, T0
i(qi) originates from zero. We have assumed that Ti(0) = 0 and are now
ready to show that in any equilibrium all suppliers oﬀer their true costs as their variable
payment when suppliers are required to choose between strictly positive but ﬁnite
marginal variable payments. Hence, while we do allow suppliers to have downwards
sloping marginal variable payments as well as ﬂat segments, this can not happen for
qi =0as T0
i(qi)=0as just shown in Lemma 2. Finally,
Lemma 3 In equilibrium T0
i(qi)=C0
i(qi) for all qi and all i ∈ M.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Having established that suppliers need bid their true costs in equilibrium, we check
that there are no equilibria where one or more suppliers, for some realization of n, ask
for a ﬁxed payment diﬀerent from their social contribution while bidding their true
costs as their variable payment.
When all suppliers bid Tj(qj)=Cj(qj), then the only candidate for an equilibrium
ﬁxed payment proﬁle is that each supplier asks for his social contribution as his ﬁxed
payment so that Sj(n)=Ssc
j (n) for each supplier j and state n. The allocation is
interior and Tj(qj)=Cj(qj) for all j by Lemma 1 to 3, and hence the allocation
is unique given our assumptions on the costs functions. Suppose that m =2 . Both
suppliers will ask for C1(q1) and C2(q2) as variable payments. They will not ask for less
than Ssc
1 (n) and Ssc
2 (n) in equilibrium as they can obtain Ssc
i (n) no matter what other
suppliers bid for their ﬁxed payment. If both suppliers ask for more, on the other hand,
12only one of them will serve the buyer; the one that asks for the greater increment will
be eliminated from consideration. Even if both ask for the same increment, it is best
to eliminate one of them. If, for example, Supplier 2 a s k sf o rh i sc o s t sa sh i sv a r i a b l e
payment and as ﬁxed payment asks for Ssc
2 (n)+ , and Supplier 1 asks for his costs and
a ﬁxed payment of Ssc
1 (n)+  , then if the buyer buys from only o n es u p p l i e rh ep a y s
less than if he buys from both; he saves  . Hence, the buyer only buys from one of
the suppliers. This, however, means that the other will cut his ﬁxed payment request
in order to be the chosen one, and so no positive   can be maintained in equilibrium.
The extension from 2 to m suppliers is trivial and requires no extra arguments.
This completes our proof of Theorem 1. ¥
Remark 1 If we replace the assumptions that C0
i(0) = 0 and T0
i(.) > 0 by C0
i(0) =
k>0 and T0
i(.) >kfor all i the proof above goes through when 0 is replaced by k in
the relevant places. See Section 4.2 for more on this.
In this manner, uncertainty in n serves to pin down the variable components and
then inclusion constraints pin down the ﬁxed components of the strategies. When
there is no uncertainty the model is a special case (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986)
and we obtain the expected multiplicity of equilibria. Bernheim and Whinston obtain
predictive power in this game by restricting bids to what they call “truthful bids”,
namely those where the bidder is indiﬀerent between all allocations made to him so
that the bidder is free of regrets ex-post. The problem is that in the absence of well
deﬁned trembles to the game their restriction remains hard to motivate. However, for
13ag i v e nn, the outcome in their setup is identical to that in our setup. Hence, our
results can be seen as providing a rationale for their reﬁnement.
Note that our equilibrium is not in dominant strategies. If, for example, the only
other supplier asks for a huge bonus in each state and bids his marginal cost as his
marginal variable payment, it will be optimal to ask for a huge bonus too. However,
this could not be an equilibrium as some supplier will be eliminated from consideration
by the buyer and the eliminated supplier will ﬁnd it in his interest to reduce his bid to
be considered. In equilibrium, supplier earnings exceed variable costs by the amount
of their social contribution. This social contribution is large if marginal costs rise
steeply with output and if the number of suppliers falls. In this event, our scheme
could be expensive to implement in practice.
3.1 Private Values Implementation
So far we have made the assumption of complete information. As a result ﬁrms
are assumed to know not only their own costs, but those of all others. Under the
implementation scheme used so far, ﬁrms cannot oﬀer their social contribution if they
do not know the costs of all other ﬁrms. We now show that Theorem 1 remains valid
even if ﬁrms only know their own costs, if we alter the implementation scheme slightly.
The altered implementation scheme has three rounds. First, all suppliers announce
variable payment functions, Ti(qi), simultaneously. Second, after being informed about
the bids of the ﬁrst round, the suppliers bid a ﬁxed payment vector Si(n). Finally, the
state, n, is realized and the buyer chooses the allocation so as to minimize the costs
for acquiring the n units. This procedure implements the allocation and payments of
14Theorem 1 as a subgame perfect equilibrium assuming ﬁrms know their own costs and
know that other suppliers have cost functions which belong to the class of functions
described in Assumption 1.
Theorem 2 Assume that cost functions are private information, that n has full sup-
port, and that for all i,T0
i(0) = 0. Then the sequential bidding game implements the
allocation and payments of Theorem 1 as a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof: In Appendix.
We now take a closer look at three assumptions made so far in our analysis.
4 Revisiting the Standing Assumptions
In this part we show what goes wrong if marginal payments requested are not strictly
positive as in Assumption 2, and what happens if marginal costs at zero are not zero
as in Assumption 1, but positive. Then we turn to the role played by the full support
assumption.
4.1 Positive Marginal Payments
The assumption T0(.) > 0 for qi > 0 is needed for uniqueness. Consider the following
counter example if this assumption is not met and marginal payments are allowed to
be negative. Let there be two suppliers with the marginal costs of Supplier 1 being
above those of Supplier 2 for each quantity q. Suppose that Supplier 2 requests a
downward sloping marginal payment function starting at his origin, while Supplier
151 oﬀers a ﬂat one of zero. Suppose that S1(n)=C1(n) while S2(n)=C1(n) −
C2(n)+( C2(n) − T2(n)) which is equal to his cost advantage in producing n plus the
variable losses he has incurred. This leaves Supplier 2 with total proﬁts of S2(n)+
(T2(n) − C2(n)) = C1(n) − C2(n) or his cost advantage in making n. The buyer is
indiﬀerent between buying from either supplier as his total price is C1(n) from either.
Note that neither supplier can do better so that this is an equilibrium. If 2 asks for
higher proﬁts, the buyer would switch to Supplier 1 who oﬀers to sell n for a payment
equal to his costs. Supplier 1 cannot supply the whole n units for a lower total price
than 2 a n dh ec a n n o tm a k ei tw o r t h w h i l ef o rt h eb u y e rt ob u ys o m eo ft h eu n i t s
from him as his marginal cost lies above Supplier 20s marginal payment function. A
similar example can be constructed if marginal payments are allowed to be negative
but increasing in quantity.
4.2 Marginal Costs Emanate from Origin
The assumption C0
i(0) = 0 also relates to uniqueness. It is made for convenience given
that we permit asymmetries across ﬁrms. Costs are always assumed to be strictly
convex. The assumption that for all i, C0
i(0) = 0 and for qi > 0,T 0
i(qi) > 0 can be
easily replaced by C0
i(0) = k, and for qi > 0,T 0
i(qi) >kas mentioned in the proof
of Theorem 1. However, allowing C0
i(0) = ki creates a problem when we restrict
bids in an analogous manner to T0
i(qi) >k i for qi > 0. Consider the following two
supplier example where Supplier 1 has a higher intercept, k1, for marginal cost than
does Supplier 2 as k2 =0 . Then the following is an equilibrium. Supplier 1 oﬀers a ﬂat
marginal payment function just a bit above k1. Supplier 2 oﬀers a marginal payment
16function which lies below the lowest point of Supplier 10s variable bid for all q; for
example he could bid one that is increasing and asymptotic to a line below k1. As this
is so, the buyer will always choose one or the other supplier and thus the suppliers
can be thought of as competing over who supplies all the n units. The supplier with
the lower cost will be the one chosen by the buyer and can make his cost advantage
in proﬁts. Thus the suppliers ask for the ﬁxed payments S1(n)=C1(n) − T1(n) and
S2(n)=C1(n) − T2(n) in this equilibrium.
Suﬃcient conditions for uniqueness in allocations when marginal cost intercepts
can diﬀer are that for all qi > 0,T 0
i(qi) > 0,a n da sqi goes to ∞, so does T0(qi).
This ensures that, at least for very large n, Supplier 1 cannot be excluded as his
marginal cost at zero must lie below the marginal bid of Supplier 2 for the last unit.
This breaks the equilibrium above. We still have a bit of a problem as all points on
the marginal payment function need not be uniquely determined by variations in n
when the intercept of the marginal payment requested diﬀer. For small n, the supplier
with the lowest marginal costs will have his maximum marginal costs lie below the
minimum marginal cost of all others, so that he is the sole supplier in equilibrium.
This supplier, will then be indiﬀerent between combinations of ﬁxed and variable bids
which give him equal proﬁts. The allocation remains eﬃcient and the equilibrium
proﬁts unique. Note that when intercepts of the marginal cost curves diﬀer not all
suppliers supply in all states. As n rises, suppliers enter in sequence as their marginal
costs at zero are met.
174.3 Bounded Support
What if the uncertainty has bounded support, that is, if n has strictly positive density
only on [0,N] and N<∞. In this case suppliers may not care about what they bid in
certain regions as the allocation never enters these regions and there can be multiplicity
as each ones bid does aﬀect the bids of others. Nevertheless, the equilibrium allocation
will still be uniquely determined in this case and equal to be the eﬃcient one. However,
when the support of the uncertainty is bounded, ﬁxed payments need not equal social
contributions.
Assume that n has strictly positive density only on [0,N] with N<∞. In order
to describe the set of equilibria in this case we need some further notation. Let
{B∗
i (qi,n)}i∈M be the equilibrium proﬁle where all suppliers ask for their true costs as





j6=i be the proﬁl ew h e r ew eh a v er e m o v e d
supplier i0s strategy. Then by Pi(qi;n,B∗
j6=i) we denote the highest payment Supplier i






Then we obtain the following results.
Theorem 3 Assume n has bounded support with N<∞. Then there exists a unique
equilibrium allocation (q∗
i(n))i∈M for each n ∈ [0,N]. It consists of each supplier i
asking for a ﬁxed payment which equals his state dependent marginal contribution
Smc
i (n;B∗), and a variable payment which equals his production costs Ci(qi) for qi ∈
[0,q ∗






i(N),N]. In this equilibrium, marginal costs are equalized across suppliers
6The function Pi(·) is deﬁned formally in the proof of Theorem 1.
18in each state and thus output is provided eﬃciently.
Proof: In Appendix.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have demonstrated the applicability of the Bernheim-Whinston (1986)
framework to situations were one buyer wishes to buy an uncertain number of units
from a small number of sellers. Adding uncertainty about total demand to the original
model of Bernheim-Whinston (1986) improves predictability by providing a unique
equilibrium. This equilibrium is furthermore ex-post eﬃcient and coincides (for each
realization of total demand) with the truthful-bid equilibrium of Bernheim-Whinston
(1986).
I nK r i s h n aa n dT r a n æ s( 2 0 0 1 )w ec o m p a r eo u rs c h e m et oaC l a r k - G r o v e s - V i c k r e y
mechanism, which delivers the same outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium. We
argue that a reason why such mechanisms are not widely used in practice is that they
provide incentives to form coalitions between the buyer and some seller(s) with the
object of colluding. Our scheme limits the extent of vulnerability to collusion between
the buyer and seller(s) because unlike the Clark-Groves-Vickrey mechanism suppliers
are paid their own bid and it is not possible for one supplier to inﬂuence the payment
to other suppliers for units they are going to deliver anyway. Both schemes provide
the same incentives for suppliers to collude and raise their joint surplus in equilibrium
at the cost of the buyer.
196 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
The key to the proof of Lemma 1 lies in realizing that even if other suppliers make





i(0) are aﬀected by i0s bid so that the maximum
available proﬁts for Supplier i state by state are given and attainable by asking for
marginal costs as the variable payment and marginal contributions state by state as
ﬁx e dp a y m e n t sa sl o n ga sS u p p l i e ri is included. Note that P0
i(0,n,B −i) > 0 since
T0
j(qj) > 0 for all qj > 0. As C0
i(0) = 0,P 0
i(0,n,B −i) >C 0
i(0) and this makes it
impossible to exclude i in any state as he can always ask for his marginal costs and a
small ﬁx e dp a y m e n ta n dd ob e t t e r .
Think of Figure 1 in making the argument. Suppose that suppliers bid the pro-
ﬁle B. Supplier j is excluded in some states and thus earns zero proﬁts there. As
T0




k(qk(qj;n,B−j)) > 0 for all suppliers, k, chosen to supply by the
buyers. This ensures that P0
j(qj;n,B−j) > 0 for all qj such that n>q j ≥ 0.T h u s ,t h e
point where P0
j(qj;n,B−j) intersects the vertical line at Oj or the point D, must be
positive for all n>0. But now as Supplier j0s marginal costs are strictly increasing
and start from Oj they must lie below P0
j(qj;n,B−j) for small qj. Hence, Supplier j
can always get included and make positive proﬁts by bidding T0
j(qj)=C0
j(qj) and
asking for positive ﬁxed payments equal to his marginal contribution. This equals
the area between P0
j(qj;n,B−j) and C0
j(qj) up to their intersection. As his marginal
20contribution is positive, this gives j positive proﬁts. Hence, in equilibrium, Supplier
j or any other supplier can not be excluded for any realization of n.7 One might
worry that gains in some realizations are oﬀs e to rm o r et h a no ﬀset by losses in other
realizations. However this is not an issue as this strategy which gives higher proﬁts
in a state where j is otherwise excluded, also attains the maximal proﬁts in all states
where j was included. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2.
There are only two possibilities if this is not true. Either all suppliers oﬀer T0
i(0) >
C0
i(0) = 0 or only some do.8 In either case, using slightly diﬀerent arguments, we show
that this could not be an equilibrium.
Suppose that all suppliers bid such that T0
i(0) >C 0
i(0) = 0 so that by continuity,
their marginal payments remain strictly positive for small supplies. But since C0
i(0) =
0, t h i sm e a n st h a tt h e r ee x i s t sa n >0, such that all suppliers oﬀer marginal payments
which exceed their marginal costs for all output levels up to   as depicted in Figure
2.T h a ti s ,T0
i(qi) >C 0
i(qi) for x ∈ [0; ). Since in equilibrium, say with allocation q,
P0
i(qi;n,·)=T0
i(qi) for all included suppliers, and as T0
i(0) > 0,P 0
i(n;n,·) > 0. This
implies that there exists  0 > 0 small enough such that for each supplier i, P 0
i(x; 0,·)
>C 0
i(x) for x ∈ [0; 0). For any realization n ∈ [0; 0) therefore, it must be that no more
7One might think that if other suppliers oﬀer a negative ﬁxed payment, that is a bribe to the
buyer for choosing them, then it may be possible for them to keep Supplier j out. However, this is
not possible as the buyer gets the ﬁxed payment as long as they are included even if he reduces their
supply.
8T0
i(0) < 0 is ruled out by assumption.
21than one supplier supplies as each supplier who supplies something, wants to supply
everything, since his residual marginal revenue P0
i(·) exceeds his marginal costs. But
we have already shown (in Lemma 1) that this is not possible in equilibrium so that
we have a contradiction.
Suppose that some suppliers Z ⊂ M bid such that T0
i(0) >C 0
i(0) while the rest of
them, Y = M\Z,b i ds u c ht h a tT0
i(0) = C0
i(0). Now as in equilibrium, all suppliers are
included for each value of n, their marginal payments oﬀered in equilibrium must be
equalized. In particular this holds for the suppliers in Y who oﬀer T0
j(0) = C0
j(0).A sn
approaches zero, by continuity, their allocation and their marginal bids in equilibrium
must approach zero as C0
i(0) = 0 for all i. Thus, there exists an  >0 small enough
such that the marginal payment requested by the suppliers j ∈ Y, in equilibrium, must
lie everywhere below the lowest T0
i(0) for i ∈ Z. This is depicted in Figure 3 where
T0
1(0) = T0
2(0) = 0 <T 0
4(0) <T 0




4(0) for all x<  . Again by continuity of T0
i(·) there exists  0 ∈ (0, ) such that for
all x ∈ [0,  0],T 0
i(x) for all i ∈ Y lies below T0
i(x) for all i ∈ Z, see Figure 3.B u t
this means that the marginal payment requested by any supplier in Z lies above the
marginal payment requested by any supplier in Y. This means that we do not have an
interior solution and someone is excluded. This is again in contradiction with Lemma
1.¥
Proof of Lemma 3.
By Lemma 2, T0
i(0) = 0. By assumption we have that T0
i(qi) > 0 for all qi > 0.
22Together these imply that for all n>0,P i(qi;n,·) is a well deﬁned function over [0,n]
with P0
i(0;n,·) > 0 and P0
i(n;n,·)=0 .
Now assume by way of contradiction that there exists an equilibrium in which
one or more of the suppliers bid such that T0
i(x) 6= C0






and let the equilibrium allocation vector be e q(n).A s
all suppliers are in and the buyer is choosing his suppliers to minimize his costs it must
be that P0
i(e qi;n, e B)=T0
i(e qi), for all i, in equilibrium. Also P0
i(e qi;n, e B)=C0
i(e qi) as the
suppliers are maximizing their proﬁts. Thus, P0
i(˜ qi(n);n, e B)=T0
i(e qi(n)) = C0
i(e qi(n)).
This is not possible as n varies, given that n has full support, unless T0
i(qi)=C0
i(qi)
for all i and all n. Why? As T0
i(e qi(n)) = C0
i(e qi(n)) we know that the horizontal sum of
T0
i(.) and of C0
i (.) over all i must intersect and do so at the quantity n. This is easiest
to see by constructing a ﬁgure, left to the reader, which has as a base of length n.
The horizontal sum of the T0
i(.) over all suppliers in M is denoted by T0
M(n). It must
intersect the horizontal sum of the C0
i(.) over the set of all suppliers M,which is denoted
by C0
M(n), somewhere on the right hand axis. This height gives the common value of
the marginal variable payment P0
i(.) for all i. Changing n changes the size of the box.
If T0
i(.) 6= C0
i(.) for some i, then there are two possibilities. Either C0
M(n) 6= T0
M(n)
so that there is an aggregate discrepancy for some n. For such n t h e r em u s tb es o m e
i for whom T0
i(e qi(n)) 6= C0
i(e qi(n)) and this contradicts the assumption that e q(n) is
an equilibrium allocation. Alternatively, C0
M(n)=T0
M(n) for all n, but for suppliers
in K ⊂ M we have T0
i(e qi(n)) 6= C0
i(e qi(n)) in such a way that the discrepancies in
C0
i(.) and T0
i(.) cancel out in the aggregate. Let these discrepancies occur in state n0
23that is for allocation e q(n0). In this case, consider any one supplier, j, from K.B y
construction, C0
j(e qj(n0)) 6= T0
j(e qj(n0)) which immediately gives a contradiction since
both have to be equal to P0
j(e qj(n0)); if C0
j(e qj(n0)) 6= P0
j(e qj(n0)) Supplier j can do better
and if T0
j(e qj(n0)) 6= P0






being an equilibrium. ¥
Proof of Theorem 2: The theorem is proved in three steps.
1. In equilibrium, all suppliers supply strictly positive quantities for all n>0. That
it is never optimal for the buyer to exclude a supplier or a set of suppliers follows
directly from the assumption that marginal variable payments are strictly upwards
s l o p i n gs t a r t i n gf r o mz e r oa n dL e m m a1 .
2. Suppose the bids in the initial round were a proﬁle T∗
i (qi)i∈M meeting the as-
sumptions made. Then there exists a unique equilibrium in the proceeding subgame in
which all suppliers ask for their marginal contributions given T∗
i (qi)i∈M. The argument
for this is in the proof of Theorem 1.
3. Thus, in the ﬁrst round, suppliers know that they will bid, and eventually get,
their marginal contribution, state by state, in the second round. So what will they
choose to bid in the ﬁr s tr o u n d ? I tf o l l o w sf r o mt h ea s s u m p t i o n0 >T 00
i (qi) > 0
that P0
i(qi;n,T ∗
j6=i) is strictly downwards sloping for all i and from the assumption
that T0
i(0) = 0 that P0
i(n;n,T ∗
j6=i)=0 . S ot h eb e s tb i di st h eo n et h a tm a x i m i z e sa
suppliers marginal contribution plus variable payment, state by state. The unique bid
that does this is a suppliers true variable cost function and this is the unique best bid
independent of the bids made by the supplier’s opponents.
24When all suppliers announce their true costs in the ﬁrst round it follows that
marginal contributions equal social contributions in the second round which concludes
the proof. ¥
Finally, we prove Theorem 3 as a corollary to Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 3:
If n has ﬁnite support, then it is straightforward to check that the set of strategy
proﬁles given in Theorem 3 all form equilibria. But why are there not other equilibria
as well? The fact that all suppliers ask for variable payments Ti(qi) equal to their
production costs Ci(qi) for qi ∈ [0,q∗
i(N)] follows from Lemma 3. B u tt h i sd o e sn o t
p i nd o w nt h er e s to fTi(·) which will aﬀect the ﬁxed payments asked for in equilibrium
when n has ﬁnite support. As established above, in equilibrium, suppliers have to
ask for their state dependent marginal contribution Smc
i (n), w h i c hw i l ld e p e n do n
Pi(qi;n,B∗∗
j6=i), where {B∗∗
i (qi,n)}i∈M is the equilibrium in question. As long as a
supplier asks for T0
i(qi) above P0
i(qi;n,B∗
j6=i), it will not be called upon to supply for
all possible realizations and so there is no cost of such a deviation. Asking for T0
i(qi) >
C0
i(qi) can never be part of an equilibrium. If it were part of an equilibrium, the
marginal contributions of other ﬁrms would exceed their social contributions. However,
if these ﬁrms asked for their marginal contributions as their ﬁxed payment, it would
be in the interest of ﬁrm i to shade its marginal bids downwards by a little bit on the
units above q∗
i(N) (since it would make a marginal proﬁt by supplying these units) and
this would cause the buyer to exclude someone which we show can never happen in






i(qi). Note that this means that the marginal
contributions of suppliers in equilibrium can be less than their social contributions. If
this occurs, then entry and investment are reduced below their optimal levels. ¥
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FIGURE 1. COMPETITION IN SUPPLY. 




















FIGURE 3. COUNTER EXAMPLE TO Ti´(0) >  0 FOR SOME i. 